Terrorism as Communication - Ders Kitabı Cevapları

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Kasım 29, 2014

Terrorism as Communication

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Terrorism as Communication


Terrorism as Communication,  Theories about terrorism abound. A common theme in many theories is that a
communicative dimension and symbolism are key features of the terrorist act (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982; Thornton, 1964; Bassiouni, 1979). The 9/11 attacks were classical acts of symbolic terror. Because New York is the heart of the US media machine it was predictable that crashing an aeroplane into a skyscraper would attract television cameras and so have them ready for the crash of another airliner into the second Twin Tower, hence guaranteeing a mass audience of North Americans to simultaneously ‘terrorize’ and provoke into anger. As acts of political communication, these terror-attacks were masterfully executed for maximal symbolic effect. 

It was violence choreographed with an American audience in mind – not as theatre, but as a televisual spectacular for a population that relies on television for its ‘understanding’ of the world. The attacks simultaneously achieved a number of ends.  They created fear across the USA because the psychological impact of destroying two skyscrapers at the very heart of the US economy was profound. It was a form of psychological warfare (Kelly and Mitchell, 1981: 282) – with the psychological damage wrought going far beyond the actual physical damage inflicted on the USA. As Bassiouni notes, such violence is specifically designed to ‘inspire terror’ not as a byproduct, but as the central outcome of the terror act (Bassiouni, 1979: 752).

They provoked anger and a desire for revenge. Because terrorism is the weapon of the weak, a key objective is to provoke the stronger party into lashing out at the terrorists’ perceived support-base (Jenkins, 1981: 5). Such acts of reprisal, repression and counter-terrorism often turn the stronger party into a ‘recruiting agent’ for the terrorist cause (Bassiouni, 1979: 757; Thornton, 1964: 86). A key al-Qaeda objective would have been to provoke US retaliation so that the USA was seen as ‘brutally repressive’ (Kelly and Mitchell, 1981: 283). They served as a global advertising vehicle (Bassiouni, 1979: 757; Thornton, 1964: 82) to propagandize al-Qaeda’s cause and grievances. As Crenshaw (1981: 386) notes: ‘the most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention’.  They demonstrated the vulnerability of the USA. For the politically weak, shattering an opponent’s image of strength and invincibility is important
(Bassiouni, 1979: 757) as a device to give ‘hope’ to one’s supporters, and to mobilize support for one’s cause (Thornton, 1964: 73–4). 212 GAZETTE VOL. 65 NO. 3 01 Louw (jr/t) 17/4/03 8:32 am Page 212
© 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Downloaded from http://gaz.sagepub.com at BOGAZICI UNIV LIBRARY on June 13, 2008 • They served as a recruiting agent (Crenshaw Hutchinson, 1978: 76) for al-Qaeda and for Muslim fundamentalist movements generally. 

 They caused political polarization (Bassiouni, 1979: 757) in both theMuslim and non-Muslim worlds. They boosted ‘morale’ (Thornton, 1964: 82) within Muslim fundamentalist groups (and other anti-American movements) and/or served to release tension and frustration within those groups (such as al-Qaeda) feeling
helpless in the face of the USA’s global hegemony.